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Specific Rules Are Needed Concerning 
Independence in Appearance
By Hans J. Dykxhoorn and Kathleen E. Sinning
In 1978 and 1979, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted 
Accounting Series Release (ASR) Nos. 
250 and 264 in response to critics of 
the accounting profession who ex­
pressed doubt that accounting firms 
that provide non-audit services to their 
audit clients can be truly independent 
in their audit work. Neither release pro­
hibited auditors from providing any 
type of non-audit service but did re­
quire disclosure of non-audit services 
in proxy statements (ASR No. 250) and 
presented relevant factors to be used 
in evaluating the scope of services to 
be performed by auditors (ASR No. 
264).
As a result of the accounting profes­
sion’s opposition to these releases, 
ASR Nos. 264 and 250 were rescind­
ed in August 1981 and January 1982, 
respectively. The SEC stated that the 
self-regulatory mechanism of the ac­
counting profession “should be able to 
generate sufficient information about 
non-audit services to enable the Com­
mission, the accounting profession 
and other interested users to monitor 
services performed by accountants.”1 
The SEC feels that its role “should re­
main one of oversight rather than 
regulation.”2 However, cognizant that 
the revocation of ASR Nos. 250 and 
264 might be considered a signal that 
the SEC is less concerned with main­
taining auditors’ independence, SEC 
Commissioner Barbara Thomas re­
marked that the withdrawal of ASR No. 
250 “requires the Commission to 
carefully monitor the effectiveness of 
the AICPA’s rules in this area...we 
must remain prepared to revisit this 
area due to the critical need to main­
tain the independence of auditors.”3
The SEC’s renewed confidence in 
the accounting profession’s ability to 
regulate itself is not unjustified. The 
profession, through the American In­
stitute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA), has had regulations, guide­
lines, and rulings concerning the in­
dependence status of auditors. The 
increased responsibility for insuring 
auditors’ complete independence 
placed on the profession by the SEC, 
however, is a heavier burden than it 
appears. It will entail developing a set 
of specific rules concerning indepen­
dence in appearance. The balance of 
this paper explains why.
Background
Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) 
audit the financial statements of many 
business entities in the United States. 
Since the emergence of the SEC in 
1934 and passage of the Securities Act 
of 1933 and the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, all publicly owned corpor­
ations under the jurisdiction of the SEC 
must undergo mandatory annual 
audits.
Even though the auditor is engaged 
by his (or her) client to express an opin­
ion on the client’s financial statements, 
the auditor’s primary responsibility is 
to those who use the financial state­
ments in making investment or lending 
decisions. The users rely on the 
auditor’s opinion that the financial 
statements present fairly the financial 
position of the client, the results of its 
operations, and the changes in its 
financial position for the year ended. 
Thus the audit function lends credibility 
to financial statements. For this credi­
bility to exist, however, the auditor 
must be independent from his audit 
clients.
The American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants has established 
“independence in mental attitude” as 
one of the generally accepted auditing 
standards. In addition, the Ethics Com­
mittee of the AICPA has promulgated 
various independence requirements in 
the Code of Ethics which is adopted by 
all State Boards of Accountancy in the 
United States.
The SEC also has an independence 
requirement for CPAs as prescribed in 
Regulation S-X as follows: “The Com­
mission will not recognize any certified 
public accountant or public accountant 
as independent who is not in fact 
independent.”4 The SEC periodically 
issues guidelines for a number of 
auditor-client relationships which it 
believes would or would not render the 
auditor independent as Accounting 
Series Releases, such as ASRs No. 
126 and 232. The AICPA does the 
same for its members by issuing Ethics 
Rulings that deal with auditor in­
dependence, as do its counterparts at 
the State level.
The Problem with Auditor 
Independence
Despite the rule-making efforts of 
the AICPA and the SEC, the auditing 
profession has been exposed to criti­
cism concerning its independence. Re­
cent Congressional investigations of 
the accounting profession were critical 
of the self-regulatory efforts of the pro­
fession and, to a lesser extent, of the 
role the SEC has played.5 The Senate 
study on the “accounting establish­
ment,” a 1960 page analysis, was 
10/The Woman CPA, October, 1983
especially concerned about the lack of 
independence of the larger accounting 
firms due to factors such as the prac­
tice of providing management advisory 
services (MAS) to audit clients. This 
study pointed out that:
“Independent auditors must have the 
complete confidence of the public for 
whose benefit the Federal securities 
laws were enacted. That confidence 
can only be maintained by strict 
adherence to standards of conduct 
which assure the public that auditors 
are truly independent and competent 
to perform their responsibilities.’’6
The implication of this statement is 
that any problem with independence is 
caused by a failure to adhere to stan­
dards of conduct and that auditors are 
unethical and are providing audit ser­
vices to clients from which they are not 
independent. A major cause of the 
independence problem, however, may 
be the “standards of conduct” them­
selves. The government study alludes 
to this by its criticism of the self- 
regulatory effort of the profession 
which includes the formulation of in­
dependence rules. As the following 
section will show, the independence 
problem is caused not by unethical 
auditors violating their Code of Ethics 
and Generally Accepted Auditing Stan­
dards but by the independence re­
quirements themselves.
The Concept of Auditor 
Independence
Independence consists of two com­
ponents: independence in fact and 
independence in appearance. The 
auditor must be both in order to be 
considered independent. Whereas in­
dependence in fact deals with the 
auditor’s state of mind or attitude 
toward the audit object, independence 
in appearance is dependent on how 
others interpret the auditor’s indepen­
dence. For an auditor to lack indepen­
dence in appearance it is not 
necessary that he or she lack in­
dependence in fact; simply having his 
or her independence questioned by a 
legitimate third party is sufficient to 
render the auditor not independent. It 
seems that the requirement for in­
dependence in appearance may be 
the more stringent of the two re­
quirements of what will be called “total 
independence.” The effectiveness and 
efficiency of two types of in­
dependence rules — general and 
specific rules — to ensure “total in­
dependence” and how they relate to 
each of the two components of the 
independence concept are analyzed 
below.
Independence in Fact
Independence in fact is a concept 
which deals with an individual auditor’s 
perception. It is generally agreed that 
there cannot be any objectively meas­
urable specific guidelines for in­
dependence in fact that are also 
operational. It is this component of the 
“total independence” concept to 
which the AICPA refers in its 
Statements of Auditing Standards 
which state that “the possession of in­
trinsic independence is a matter of per­
sonal quality rather than of rules that 
formulate certain objective tests.”7
To ensure independence in fact in 
all cases, all that is necessary is a 
general rule mandating auditors’ in­
dependence in fact such as the second 
general auditing standard which man­
dates that in “all matters relating to the 
assignment, an independence in men­
tal attitude is to be maintained by the 
auditor or auditors.”8 Of course, the 
implicit assumption is that all auditors 
are ethical, that is, no auditor will 
accept an audit engagement if he 
believes that the audit cannot be ob­
jectively and unbiasedly conducted. 
Whether this assumption holds is an 
empirical question that is beyond the 
scope of this paper. However, there is 
no reason to doubt that the U.S. ac­
counting profession in general consists 
of highly ethical and professional peo­
ple. Unethical conduct seems to be the 
rare exception that occurs in any pro­
fessional group.
A rule making body could not devise 
a set of uniform specific rules to apply 
to all auditors to ensure independence 
in fact because the rules would have 
to be separately designed for each in­
dividual auditor. The rules would have 
to reflect each auditor’s independent 
mental attitude toward each and every 
possible auditor-client relationship. 
Since no one can know an auditor’s 
own mind as well as the auditor him­
self, developing such a set of com­
prehensive rules would be impossible. 
Therefore, a general rule would be 
most appropriate and is sufficient to 
ensure independence in fact.
A general rule, however, is subject 
to individual interpretation. Since per­
ceptions of a general rule are bound to 
differ for some persons, different audi­
tors will arrive at different decisions 
concerning acceptance or rejection of 
Independence in appearance 
deals with the collective 
perceptions of users of 
financial statements.
an audit engagement based on the cri­
terion of independence in fact alone. 
Thus, the general rule will result in 
divergent interpretations in many 
cases. Nonetheless, independence in 
fact will have been achieved for all 
auditors, assuming ethical behavior.
Independence in 
Appearance
In contrast to independence in fact, 
independence in appearance is a con­
cept that deals with the collective 
perceptions of users of financial state­
ments. Independence in appearance 
requires that an auditor must appear 
to be independent to a third party. 
Whether or not the auditor is indepen­
dent in fact is not a concern of this 
criterion.
In determining whether or not he is 
independent in appearance, an auditor 
could be guided by two types of rules: 
A general rule which requires the 
auditor to be independent in appear­
ance, such as the Code of Ethics,9 and 
specific rules10 which cover every type 
of auditor-client relationship.
A general rule would require the 
auditor to decline any audit engage­
ment that would impair his or her 
independence in appearance. The 
auditor would have to judge each situa­
tion when confronted with it to deter­
mine if the general rule indicates that 
he is not independent. Even if all 
auditors are ethical, they may even­
tually violate the general rule since 
they are dealing with others’ percep­
tions of their independence. They may 
accept engagements that, unknown to 
them, impair their independence in ap­
pearance or decline engagements in 
which third parties would actually view 
them as independent.
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In sum, a general rule will not ensure 
independence in appearance for all 
situations. It is a sufficient rule only in 
the extreme case where all auditor­
client relationships are considered in­
dependent in appearance or if it is 
assumed that all auditors will interpret 
the general independence in appear­
ance rule correctly. A general rule deal­
ing with the independence in ap­
pearance requirement is not sufficient 
because it may result in auditors ac­
cepting audit engagements that should 
not be accepted and rejecting 
engagements that could have been 
carried out.
If an auditor’s independence in ap­
pearance decision is to be guided by 
specific rules only, a complete set of 
specific rules must be developed by a 
rule making body and made known to 
all auditors. A set of specific rules 
alone would be sufficient to assure in­
dependence in appearance for all audit 
engagements because the auditor, 
assumed to be ethical, would need 
only to refer to these complete specific 
rules to determine whether or not a 
given auditor-client relationship would 
render him not independent in appear­
ance and thus, whether or not to ac­
cept an engagement.
As a result of the above analyses, 
it becomes apparent that the follow­
ing conditions would be sufficient 
to ensure an auditor’s “total inde­
pendence:”
1. A general rule mandating inde­
pendence in fact.
2. Specific rules concerning inde­
pendence in appearance for all 
auditor-client relationships.
3. Ethical auditor behavior, that is, an 
auditor will decline any audit engage­
ment which impairs his or her inde­
pendence in fact and/or independence 
in appearance.
Auditor-Client Relationships
Recent empirical research indicates 
that there may be differences in the 
perceptions of auditors’ independence 
between auditors and certain groups 
of financial statement users. Lavin11 in­
vestigated the perceptions of auditors’ 
independence for a sample of CPAs, 
bank loan officers, and financial 
analysts of brokerage houses. In a mail 
questionnaire, the sample subjects 
were asked to indicate for each of 
twelve different auditor-client relation­
ships take from ASR No. 126 whether 
they considered the auditors involved 
to be independent or not independent.
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Lavin found that there were statistically 
significant differences in the responses 
of the three sample groups for six of 
the twelve situations. In five of the six 
situations significance was not caused 
by one group considering the auditors 
to be independent and the other 
groups not but rather by the degree of 
consensus between the three groups. 
However, in the auditor client relation­
ship in which an accounting firm pro­
vided bookkeeping services for its 
audit client, a majority of the CPAs 
questioned considered the auditors to 
lack independence while the two finan­
cial statement user groups perceived 
the auditors to be independent.
Imhoff12 conducted a survey which 
included a similar sample group of 
CPAs and financial statement users. 
He investigated the perceived effect on 
an accounting firm’s independence if 
employees of their audit staff accepted 
employment at companies that they 
had previously audited. The results of 
this study indicate that users are 
somewhat more critical of CPAs ac­
cepting positions with client firms than 
are practicing CPAs.13
A study by Pearson and Ryans14 
which investigated how practicing 
CPAs, Chartered Financial Analysts, 
and corporate accountants perceived 
potential auditor-management con­
flicts also found differences in percep­
tions of auditor independence between 
CPAs and non-CPAs for some situa­
tions. Empirical research conducted in 
Germany15 and the United Kingdom16 
also indicate that differences between 
auditors and financial statement users 
may exist.
Although the conclusions of these 
studies are limited to the auditor-client 
relationships investigated, they indi­
cate that problems may arise for the 
auditing profession if no specific rules 
are devised concerning independence 
in appearance for those auditor-client 
relationships in which differences ex­
ist between the perceptions of auditors 
and users of financial statements.
Admittedly, the problem exists only 
if the users of financial statements take 
a stricter view of the auditors’ in­
dependence than the auditors. This 
was not conclusively shown in the 
Lavin study. The results obtained by 
Imhoff and Pearson and Ryans seem 
to indicate that users of financial 
statements are more inclined to con­
sider auditors’ independence to be im­
paired than the auditors themselves. 
These findings take on more signifi­
cance since the studies included some 
auditor-client relationships that have 
not been properly addressed by the 
SEC or AICPA such as auditors ac­
cepting employment at companies 
they are currently auditing or have 
previously audited or the situation in 
which an accounting firm received a 
significant portion of its total revenue 
from one audit client. Since these 
auditor-client relationships have not 
been addressed, there is very little 
guidance available to the auditor and, 
as a result, a risk that independence 
in appearance may be violated.
The above analysis indicates that 
the controversy surrounding auditors’ 
independence arises from having a 
general requirement that auditors must 
be independent in appearance and a 
lack of specific rules. The solution, 
thus, is to identify and prohibit all 
auditor-client relationships for which 
the consensus perceptions of users of 
financial statements are that the audi­
tors lack independence. The definition 
of what represents consensus and who 
represents users of financial statement 
must be left to an appropriate rule 
making body.
It seems unlikely, however, that the 
rule making body will be able to devise 
complete specific rules concerning 
independence in appearance. To over­
come the practical limitation of de­
vising complete specific independence 
in appearance rules, even though an 
effort should be made toward com­
prehensive coverage, the current 
general requirement of independence 
in appearance must be changed so 
that it applies only to those auditor­
client relationships prohibited by the 
specific rules. In other words, an 
auditor’s independence in appearance 
would only be impaired if he violates 
any of the specific rules. This will 
eliminate the auditor’s present uncer­
tainty in deciding whether he is in­
dependent in appearance or not.
Thus, the task of ensuring indepen­
dence in appearance rests with the ef­
forts of the rule making body. Any 
independence in appearance prob­
lems that arise after the rule making 
body has devised and published its 
specific rules will be the result of the 
unresponsiveness of the body in 
reflecting the perceptions of financial 
statement users. (Unethical auditors 
can also create independence prob­
lems. However, as mentioned earlier, 
this is not a serious consideration.) The 
rule making body should base its deci­
sions on empirical research of the 
perceptions of users.
Conclusions
Auditors must be independent in fact 
and in appearance. A general rule re­
quiring auditors to be independent in 
fact is the only way to deal with this 
component of the independence con­
cept. However, a general rule requir­
ing auditors to be independent in 
appearance is not appropriate if 
perceptions of auditor independence 
differ between auditors and users of 
financial statements. Some research 
indicates that there are differences of 
perceptions between these two 
groups. Consequently, the possibility 
exists that auditors may accept 
engagements which may render them 
not independent in appearance unless 
there are specific rules prohibiting 
such engagements. Thus the con­
troversy surrounding auditor inde­
pendence stems from the general 
requirement that auditors must be 
independent in appearance and the 
lack of complete specific rules in­
dicating which relationships will impair 
their appearance of independence. To 
solve the independence problem the 
following changes should be 
implemented:
1. A rule making body should devise 
comprehensive specific rules pro­
hibiting any auditor-client relation­
ships which are considered by users 
of financial statements to impair in­
dependence in appearance, and 
2. the requirement for independence 
in appearance should be redefined so 
that auditors could only be accused 
of not being independent in appear­
ance if they violated any of the 
specific independence in appearance 
rules.
Even with the best effort it is unlikely 
that the proposed comprehensive 
rules will be complete, that is, that they 
will cover every possible auditor-client 
relationship. Thus requirement (2) is 
needed to eliminate the auditors’ 
uncertainty for situations where 
specific rules are lacking concerning 
independence in appearance. This, 
however, shifts the burden of ensuring 
independence in appearance to the 
rule making body. As noted above, the 
SEC is currently relying more on the 
accounting profession’s self-regulating 
effort. The profession could continue 
to promulgate the more comprehen­
sive specific rules through the Ethics
Committee of the AICPA. However, it 
seems advisable to appoint a rule mak­
ing body which will be independent of 
the AICPA to gain the credibility of the 
financial statement users. By limiting 
the independence in appearance re­
quirement to specific rules only, most 
criticism of the lack of auditors’ inde­
pendence in appearance is likely to 
arise from a perceived inadequacy of 
specific rules, or standards of conduct, 
which is the responsibility of the rule 
making body. Since actual lack of in­
dependence in appearance will be 
limited to violations of any specific 
rules such misconduct could be dealt 
with through disciplinary action. Ω
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